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TO TELL THE TRUTH: SHOULD JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL




In the film "Liar Liar," actor Jim Carrey plays the part of a
lawyer who is largely an absentee father.' As the son of Carrey's
character celebrates his birthday without the promised presence
of his workaholic father, the child makes a wish that his father
will not be able to lie for twenty-four hours An effective spell is
cast, placing the lawyer in danger of losing clients, cases, and
'face' in numerous social situations where his inability to proffer
little white lies results in gaffes of the highest order.3 Hollywood
produces larger than life depictions of our society, but it is no ex-
aggeration to say that we live in a society where truth is at a
premium. That is to say, truth is far from routinely expressed or
even expected.
Individuals subjected to arrest are entitled to be warned
that anything they say (including of course, the truth) can, and
may be used against them. The thinly veiled message behind
the Miranda warnings seems to be that if you tell the truth, you
may not be well served. Telling the truth may be a distant con-
" Associate Professor and Chair, Business Law, Wallace E. Carroll School of
Management, Boston College. A.B. Boston College, 1975; J.D. Boston College Law
School, 1978. An earlier version of this article appeared in the Business Law Review,
published by the North Atlantic Regional Business Law Association. This research
was supported by a Boston College University Faculty Fellowship. The author
wishes to thank John G. Neylon, Esq., Neylon & O'Brien, Boston, Mass., and Kevin
McGann, Esq., for their invaluable assistance with this project, as well as Professor
David P. Twomey, Boston College, who initially brought this topic to her attention.
' LIAR LIAR (Universal City Studios, Inc. 1997).
2 See i&d
3 See id
4 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (holding that before a line of
questioning ensues, a defendant must be advised of the "right to remain silent, that
any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has
a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed").
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cern that has little to do with positive practical consequences for
the truthteller. One wonders why a potential criminal is legally
entitled to such sage advice at the time of arrest, and yet dis-
abled Americans receive no comparable admonition at the time
they file for disability benefits under the Federal Social Security
Administration (SSA) Supplemental Security Income (SSI), and
Supplemental Security Disability Income (SSDI) programs.5 As
the federal courts of appeal struggle with the issue of disability
representations made at the time of application for benefits,
some allow such representations to bar an otherwise valid
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) claim. Thus, at the pre-
sent time, saying the wrong things, writing the wrong words,
perhaps even telling the truth when filing for benefits, may re-
sult in forfeiture of the statutory right to protest employment
discrimination resulting from the disability.7 This backlash
against statements made for benefits' purposes may force the
disabled to choose between benefits they may need immediately
and a more speculative, yet more complete remedy under the
ADA. 8
This article analyzes the use of the doctrine of judicial es-
toppel as a bar to an ADA claim where a plaintiff has previously
asserted a total disability in order to obtain sustaining benefits.
5 See Wendy Wilkinson, Judicially Crafted Barriers to Bringing Suit Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 907, 921 (1997) (discussing the
need for individuals to carefully qualify statements regarding disability on claim
forms). Of course crimes carry weightier penalties than the loss of civil rights, but
the notion persists that the disabled should receive some guidance through the pre-
sent legal thicket.
6See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (1994).
See Marney Collins Sims, Comment, Estop It! Judicial Estoppel and Its Use in
Americans with Disabilities Act Litigation, 34 HoUS. L. REv. 843, 870 (1997)
(discussing the split in federal courts and noting that judicial estoppel is unneces-
sary since receipt of disability benefits is only one piece of evidence for courts to
take into account when facing a defendant's motion for summary judgment).
7See Andrea Christensen Luby, Note, Estopping Enforcement of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 13 J.L. & POL. 415, 450 (1997) (criticizing oversimplified judi-
cial view of disability benefit claims as inconsistent with ADA claims and advocating
that courts allow claimants to correct or reconcile prior disability statements in an
ADA context); see also Christine Neylon O'Brien, Employment Discrimination
Claims Remain Valid Despite After-Acquired Evidence of Employee Wrongdoing, 23
PEPP. L. REv. 65, 67 n.10 (1995) (stating that "important public policy is served
when the law encourages parties and witnesses to tell the truth").
8 See McNemar v. Disney Stores, Inc., 91 F.3d 610, 620 (3d Cir. 1996)
(discussing McNemar's use of this unfair choice argument), cert. denied, 519 U.S.
1115 (1997).
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The author argues that there are numerous reasons why estop-
pel should not be automatically applied to preclude such ADA
complaints.9 The definitions of disability differ from one statute
to another, and the policies behind the federal statutes and pro-
grams vary as well. ° It may be that a person is disabled for pur-
poses of benefit eligibility and yet remains able to perform the
essential functions of a job with reasonable accommodations
from the employer." The assessment of benefit eligibility often
is a presumptive, generalized determination derived from medi-
cal documentation of accepted conditions.'
In contrast, the inquiry as to whether a plaintiff is qualified
under the ADA is laden with individualized factual issues."
Whether the plaintiff is able to perform the essential functions of
the job in question and whether the employer has reasonably ac-
commodated the plaintiff are fact-based questions that require
9 Much of the scholarly commentary on the topic seems to run in favor of cur-
tailing the use of estoppel. See Matthew Diller, Dissonant Disability Policies: The
Tensions Between the Americans with Disabilities Act and Federal Disability Benefit
Programs, 76 TEx. L. REV. 1003, 1080-82 (1998); Maureen C. Weston, The Road
Best Traveled Removing Judicial Roadblocks That Prevent Workers from Obtaining
Both Disability Benefits and ADA Civil Rights Protection, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 377,
444 (1997); Anne E. Beaumont, Note, This Estoppel Has Got to Stop: Judicial Es-
toppel and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1529, 1542 (1996);
Elissa Kirby, Recent Decision, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 349, 349-50 (1997); Luby, supra
note 7, at 453; Sims, supra note 6, at 872. But see Jorge M. Leon, Two Hats, One
Head Reconciling Disability Benefits and the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990, 1997 ILL. L. REV. 1139 (arguing that individuals who claim total disability for
benefit purposes "should be judicially estopped or prevented as a matter of law from
pursuing an employment claim under the ADA").
10 See Beaumont, supra note 9, at 1543-50 (comparing definitions); Sims, supra
note 6, at 865-68 (noting that precluding a recipient of benefits of SSA from return-
ing to work would be against the policy of both the SSA and the ADA);
" See Wilkinson, supra note 5, at 928 (recognizing the distinction between a
statement on a disability application form and an inquiry into whether an applicant
is "otherwise qualified" to perform a job); Luby, supra note 7, at 427-29 (discussing
that "total disability" may not necessarily be inconsistent with "qualified individual"
status). Judge Easterbrook characterizes the plaintiff with a categorical, listed im-
pairment under SSA as "disabled in law even though not disabled in fact" if she can
work with reasonable accommodation. Wilson v. Chrysler Corp., 172 F.3d 500, 512
(7th Cir. 1999) (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
12 See Wilkinson, supra note 5, at 928-29 (describing SSA as a medical approach
to determine whether disability exists); Beaumont, supra note 9, at 1548-50
(describing benefit classifications).
13 See Beaumont, supra note 9, at 1559 (noting that evaluation of disability un-
der the ADA demands an individualized approach); Sims, supra note 6, at 846-47
(comparing elements of an ADA claim).
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particularized evidentiary development.'4 In addition, the abili-
ties of the disabled individual may have changed since the initial
representations were made and documented.15 The facts con-
cerning a disability may be weighted differently in the ADA con-
text, and thus, the discrimination question should generally not
be swept aside at the summary judgment stage. 6 Consequently,
the doctrine of judicial estoppel should at most enjoy a measured
use in the ADA context."
This article suggests a better process than the use of estop-
pel, that is, amendment of the ADA to address the problem.' 8
This is important because even though the EEOC has issued
guidance on the topic and the agency's advice is essentially
sound, 9 the courts are not bound to adhere to the EEOC's rec-
14 See Beaumont, supra note 9, at 1562 (stating that inquiry into ADA disability
status requires a case-by-case examination of individual claims).
15 See id. at 1573 (realizing that the phenomenon of disability is not a static one
and, therefore, disabilities may improve and an individual's status may change).
16 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) makes an analogy
to the treatment of after-acquired evidence in employment discrimination cases.
Seeing the use of judicial estoppel as another such "general equitable doctrine" as
the after-acquired evidence doctrine that the Supreme Court dealt with in McKen-
non v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 513 U.S. 352 (1995), the EEOC advises that
the enforcement of the ADA would suffer if individuals were barred from presenting
the merits of their discrimination claims because of prior disability benefits claims.
See EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Disability Representations, EEOC Notice No.
915.002 (Feb. 12, 1997), reprinted in Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 31, at E-1 (Feb. 14,
1997) [hereinafter EEOC Guidance]. See Christine Neylon O'Brien, The Impact of
After-Acquired Evidence in Employment Discrimination Cases after McKennon v.
Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 29 CREIGHTON L. REV. 675, 682 (1996), reprinted
in 47 LAB. L.J. 3 (1996) (discussing the Supreme Court's holding that after-acquired
evidence should not bar employer's liability for employment discrimination, but
rather should be relevant to the remedy).
17 See Heather Hamilton, Judicial Estoppel, Social Security Disability Benefits
and the ADA- The Circuits Diverge, 9 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 127, 156-57 (1996)
(recommending a moderate statement-based approach to the use of judicial estoppel
in this context).
'8 A second-best choice might be the use of administrative agency rulemaking
that would clarify the appropriate use of estoppel in the ADA context. This option is
an improvement over the use of Enforcement Guidance by the EEOC in that rule-
making carries more weight within the judicial system See Nancy Montweiler,
News, Civil Rights: Advocacy Group Calls Clinton Record 'Mixed'; Professor Sug-
gests More EEOC Rulemaking, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 51, at A-1 (Mar. 17, 1997)
(noting that agency carries more clout in its rulemaking than as a litigant).
9 See EEOC Guidance, supra note 16; see also infra notes 98-102 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the EEOC Guidance); cf. News, Disabilities Discrimination:
EEOC Policy on Inconsistent Statements 'Goes Too Far,' Management Attorney Says,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 141, at A-12 (July 23, 1997); Kimberly Jane Houghton,
Commentary, Having Total Disability and Claiming It, Too: The EEOC's Position
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omrnendations.'0 In fact, since the issuance of the EEOC Guid-
ance, several appellate court decisions have not followed the
EEOC's explicit advice on the effect of disability representations
upon disability discrimination complaints.2 Also, the United
Against the Use of Judicial Estoppel in Americans With Disabilities Act Cases May
Hurt More than It Helps, 49 ALA. L. REV. 645, 663-72 (1998) (arguing that judicial
estoppel is still necessary to preserve the integrity of the judicial system in some
instances and that courts don't agree with the EEOC's position).
20 The Commission's position is discussed infra notes 98-102 and accompanying
text.
21 See Bernard Mower, News, Disabilities: Appeals Courts Block Disability Bias
Suits in Light of Prior Assertion of Inability to Work, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 169,
at A-i, A-2 (Sept. 2, 1997) (summarizing three cases from the Fifth, Seventh, and
Eighth Circuits, all decided subsequent to the issuance of the EEOC Guidance, su-
pra note 16, and all barred relief on disability bias claims); see also Susan J. McGol-
rick, Disabilities Discrimination, Fifth Circuit Bars ADA Claims of Manager With
Jaw Disease Who Sought Benefits, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at A-2 (Jan. 16,
1998) (discussing McConathy v. Dr. PepperlSeven Up Corp., 131 F.3d 558 (5th Cir.
1998), where the court concluded that-an application for and receipt of social secu-
rity disability benefits creates a rebuttable presumption that a plaintiff is judicially
estopped from asserting that she was qualified for purposes of an ADA claim); cf.
Moore v. Payless Shoe Source, Inc., 139 F.3d 1210, 1211 (8th Cir. 1998) (upholding
summary judgment for the defendant employer in an ADA case where the plaintiff
"failed to present the 'strong countervailing evidence' needed to defeat summary
judgment when an ADA claimant has represented to the Social Security Admini-
stration that she is 'unable to work' " (quoting Dush v. Appleton Elec. Co., 124 F.3d
957, 963 (8th Cir. 1997))); Simon v. Safelite Glass Corp., 128 F.3d 68, 72 (2d Cir.
1997) (limiting the use of judicial estoppel in a related age discrimination case to
situations where "a tribunal in a prior proceeding has accepted the claim at issue by
rendering a favorable decision").
However, according to the Eleventh Circuit, a majority of federal circuits reject
a blanket bar on ADA lawsuits because of prior total disability claim for benefit
purposes. See Barbara Yuill, Disabilities Discrimination, Eleventh Circuit Joins Sis-
ter Circuits, Finds Disability Benefits Do Not Bar ADA Suit, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
No. 232, at A-9 (Dec. 3, 1997); see also, e.g., Wilson v. Chrysler Corp., 172 F.3d 500,
503, 504-05, 506 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding plaintiffs "position before the [SSAI ... in-
consistent with her subsequent allegation of constructive discharge" and a basis for
estopping her retaliation claim, while noting that grant of SSA benefits "is not nec-
essarily dispositive of the issue whether an individual is qualified to work" and even
where judicial estoppel operates, it is not irrebuttable); Flowers v. Komatsu Mining
Sys., Inc., 165 F.3d 554, 556-57 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding social security determina-
tion of disability not relevant to ADA liability "in this case," but that it was relevant
to back pay award, and also finding that the receipt of SSA "benefits d[idl not pre-
clude a person, as a matter of law, from being a qualified person with a disability"
(citing McCreary v. Libbey-Owens-Ford, Co., 132 F.3d 1159 (7th Cir. 1997) and Wei-
gel v. Target Stores, 122 F.3d 461 (7th Cir. 1997))); Haschmann v. Time Warner En-
tertainment Co., 151 F.3d 591, 603 (7th Cir. 1998) (upholding district court's refusal
to apply judicial estoppel based upon ADA plaintiffs application for and receipt of
Social Security disability benefits since employee may still be "a qualified individ-
ual" under the ADA); Aldrich v. Boeing Co., 146 F.3d 1265, 1268-69 (10th Cir. 1998)
(applying rule from Rascon v. US West Communications, Inc., 143 F.3d 1324, 1330
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States Supreme Court has left undisturbed a Third Circuit deci-
sion that was directly criticized in the EEOC Guidance, that of
McNemar v. Disney Stores, Inc.' In light of all this, the best in-
terests of the disabled are not being fully served absent fresh
legislative action.
I. MCNEMAR V. DISNEY STORES, INC.
In November 1993, the "Disney Store" (Disney) in Cherry
Hill, New Jersey fired assistant manager Leonard McNemar,
who was HIV-positive, for stealing two dollars from the regis-
ter.' A year later McNemar filed a lawsuit against Disney un-
der, inter alia, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
(ADA), arguing that his dismissal was not the result of his in-
fraction, but rather due to the rumor that he had AIDS.'
(10th Cir. 1998), to a plaintiff who received private disability benefits), cert. denied,
67 U.S.L.W. 3376 (U.S. June 1, 1999) (No. 98-859); Rascon, 143 F.3d at 1330
(holding that statements made for SSA benefit purposes do not automatically bar an
ADA claim, but that they may be relevant to whether the plaintiff is a "qualified
individual with a disability" under the ADA); Nowak v. St. Rita High Sch., 142 F.3d
999, 1004 & n.2 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that there is no per se rule of preclusion to
ADA claims to those who have asserted disability for SSA benefit purposes because
of fundamental differences in definitions and finding support in the Third Circuit's
decision in Krouse v. American Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 503 (3d Cir. 1997), to
retreat from its earlier position favoring judicial estoppel); Johnson v. Oregon, 141
F.3d 1361, 1367 (9th Cir. 1998) (concluding that an individual may be entitled to
disability benefits and yet be qualified to work with reasonable accommodation);
Taylor v. Food World, Inc., 133 F.3d 1419, 1425 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that the
plaintiff was not judicially estopped from bringing an ADA claim despite his asser-
tion of a listed impairment under SSA, because he should be afforded the opportu-
nity to establish his "qualified" individual status "with or without accommodation"
under the ADA); McCreary v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 132 F.3d 1159, 1166-67 (7th
Cir. 1997) (reversing the district court's finding that plaintiff was estopped from
pursuing an ADA claim because of his filing for Social Security disability benefits);
Swanks v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 116 F.3d 582, 590 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (holding that representations on a disability benefits application are merely
one piece of evidence that an ADA plaintiff is not qualified).
2 91 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996), cert denied, 519 U.S. 1115 (1997). See EEOC Guid-
ance, supra note 16, at E-7 to E-8 & n.66; see also infra notes 23-36 and accompany-
ing text; Kirby, supra note 9, at 340-52 (discussing Third Circuit's position on judi-
cial estoppel and comparing McNemar to Ryan Operations G.P. v. Santiam-Midwest
Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355 (3d Cir. 1996), where requirements of prior success and
privity of parties were deemed unnecessary in order to apply judicial estoppel). In
Krouse, the Third Circuit distinguished an ADA retaliation claim from an ADA dis-
crimination case such as McNemar, and noted the considerable criticism evoked by
McNemar. See Krouse, 126 F.3d at 502-03 & nn.3-4. In fact, Judge Becker advo-
cated reconsideration of the "wrongly decided" McNemar. Id. at 503 n.4.
2 See McNemar, 91 F.3d at 613-14.
24 See id. at 616.
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In order to qualify for employment-related protection under
the ADA, McNemar had to first show that he was a "qualified
person" under the law.' Specifically he had to show that he was
an individual" 'with a disability who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of a job.' "26
To claim unfair dismissal from a position because of a handicap,
the law requires that one first demonstrate that the handicap
was not so severe that he or she was unable to perform the job.27
Soon after his unemployment in 1993, and based on his HIV-
positive condition, McNemar applied for disability benefits under
the SSI and SSDI programs.' In order to be eligible for these
programs, he claimed that his disability had prevented him from
working since October 1993, a month before his dismissal.29 He
had, in fact, missed 68% of his scheduled workdays during that
period.30
In McNemar, the federal district court ruled that since the
plaintiff had stated under penalty of law in these applications
that he was completely disabled since October 1993, he could not
then assert that he qualified for protection under the ADA,
which required that, at the time of his dismissal in November, he
could perform the essential functions of his position.3 1 His case
was dismissed on summary judgment, but he appealed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. 2
The Third Circuit upheld the lower court, and ruled that
where he had made prior sworn statements inconsistent with his
present position, the policy of "judicial estoppel" would be ap-
plied, preventing him from proceeding with his ADA claim.33 The
appeals court quoted the lower court with approval when it said,
" 'it is the province of the legislature rather than this Court to
authorize such a double recovery.' "'4 Analytically, the court
concluded that McNemar could not present the prima facie case
required to proceed, because he could not overcome the threshold
2S Id at 619.
28 Id. at 618 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(8), 12112(a) (1994)).
27 See id.
28 See id at 615.
23 See id.
30 See id. at 613.
31 See id.
See id.
See id. at 619-20.
4 Id. at 620 (quoting lower court).
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question of whether or not he was "qualified for the job."5
This case is only one among many recent decisions where
the courts have denied an ADA plaintiff a hearing, because the
plaintiffs have applied for other disability benefits after the inci-
dent of alleged discrimination." The doctrine of judicial estoppel
has been invoked by the courts in many cases, but as will be dis-
cussed, it is not clear that this doctrine has been properly ap-
plied, either under its historical usage or in the context of the
goals and language of the ADA.
II. JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL
7
Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine intended to pre-
vent an individual from asserting one set of facts before one
court, and a different set of facts before another court.38 It is of-
ten applied to criminal defendants on appeal. 9 The doctrine has
appeared in many forms and under many names," but as used in
modern courts it has some elements of issue preclusion, equita-
ble estoppel, and estoppel in pais.4' Where the parties and issue
are identical in successive proceedings, and the issue was essen-
tial to the judgment in the earlier proceeding, issue preclusion
deems the judgment on that issue conclusive for purposes of the
second action.42 It can also be used by one who was not a party
to the first action, which is called "non-mutual" estoppel. 43 Es-
toppel in pais prevents a party from changing a statement or an
35 Id. at 621.
3c See supra notes 21-22.
s7 Some courts use summary judgment to dispose of the claims discussed in this
article. See Kennedy v. Applause, Inc., 90 F.3d 1477, 1481 n.3 (9th Cir. 1996). As
Anne Beaumont explained, because summary judgment achieves the same end as
judicial estoppel-concluding litigation of the claim as a matter of law-these cases
are included in this discussion. See Beaumont, supra note 9, at 1551 n.114.
38 See Eric A. Schreiber, The Judiciary Says, You Can't Have it Both Ways: Ju-
dicial Estoppel-A Doctrine Precluding Inconsistent Positions, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
323, 323-24 (1996); see also Rand G. Boyers, Comment, Precluding Inconsistent
Statements: The Doctrine of Judicial Estoppel, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 1244, 1244 n.2
(1986) (explaining forms of estoppel).
"9 See State v. Washington, 419 N.W.2d 275, 277 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987)
(explaining the use of judicial estoppel in a criminal trial).40 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 551-52 (6th ed. 1990).
41 See Beaumont, supra note 9, at 1551 (noting that all of these doctrines
achieve the same end).
42 See id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982).
See Parldane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327-32 (1979).
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assertion of particular facts made in a prior proceeding." Equi-
table estoppel can be asserted by a party to a second action if in
a former proceeding the parties were adverse, the party assert-
ing estoppel relied on the opponent's assertion to its detriment,
and that party would be prejudiced if the court allowed a change
of position."
The primary purpose of the judicial estoppel doctrine is to
protect the integrity of the judicial process from the manipula-
tion of facts.46 Some courts require a finding of "bad faith" to in-
voke the doctrine.47 Most commentators have found that courts
base their use of the doctrine on either: (a) whether the claimant
has "adopted" the statement by having it accepted as a fact be-
fore an earlier court (the "success" category); or (b) whether, re-
gardless of adoption, the claimant has presented differing facts
before two different tribunals (the "fast and loose" family).48 An-
other variation relies solely on the offense of violating the sanc-
tity of the oath.49 Nevertheless, in cases where judicial estoppel
has been applied, the following five elements usually appear in
the analysis:
(1) The two positions must be taken by the same party; (2) the
positions must be taken in judicial or quasi-judicial administra-
tive proceedings; (3) the records of the two proceedings must
clearly reflect that the party to be estopped intended the triers
of fact to accept the truth of the facts alleged in support of the
positions; (4) the party taking the positions must have been suc-
cessful in maintaining the first position and must have received
some benefit thereby in the first proceeding; [and] (5) the two
positions must be totally inconsistent. 0
It is in this last requirement-that the two positions be to-
tally inconsistent-that courts seem to overlook the subtleties of
fact in each case, as well as the distinctly different objectives of
"See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 551 (6th ed. 1990).
4 See Schreiber, supra note 38, at 331.
' See McNemar v. Disney Store, Inc., 91 F.3d 610, 617 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. de-
nied, 519 U.S. 1115 (1997); Yanez v. United States, 989 F.2d 323, 326 (9th Cir. 1993)
(citing Morris v. California, 966 F.2d 448 (9th Cir. 1991)).
47 Ryan Operations G.P. v. Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355, 362 (3d
Cir. 1996).
48 Ashley S. Deeks, Comment, Raising the Cost of Living: Rethinking Erie for
Judicial Estoppel, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 873, 876-79 (1997).
49 See Schreiber, supra note 38, at 325.
r' Muellner v. Mars, Inc., 714 F. Supp. 351, 357 (N.D. IlM. 1989) (quoting De-
partment of Trans. v. Grawe, 467 N.E.2d 467,471 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983)).
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the statutory income programs (SSI and SSDI) and the ADA.
August v. Offices Unlimited, Inc.,51 is a useful early example
of a court of appeals invoking judicial estoppel principles to pre-
vent a disability claimant from pursuing discrimination charges
against his employer.52 After twenty years of work for Offices
Unlimited, August requested and was granted a leave of absence
from work on March 24, 1989 to recover from depression." On
May 11, August asked to return on a part-time basis and to be
excused from the first few morning meetings when the side-
effects of his medication were strongest. His supervisor refused,
and the Director of Administration suggested he apply for com-
pany-sponsored disability benefits.' His leave was extended to
May 22. He applied for benefits the next day, stating that he
had been "totally disabled" since March 24.56 When he was un-
able to return to work in late May 1989, he was terminated. 7 In
1990 he filed suit against his employer under, inter alia, state
law which protects the handicapped in Massachusetts from dis-
crimination in language analogous to the terms of the ADA.5 8
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit upheld the district
court's grant of summary judgment for the employer stating
that: "[ulnder any definition of the term, August's declaration
that he was 'totally disabled' means that he was not able to per-
form the essential functions of his job at OUI, with or without
reasonable accommodation, since late March 1989.""9 This con-
clusion was reached by referring to Black's Law Dictionary, since
the record did not reveal the insurer's definition of disability.'
There was no evidence before the court upon which it could deny
summary judgment.6' Although summary judgment views the
evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, it was
r" 981 F.2d 576 (lst Cir. 1992).
52 See id. at 584; see also infra notes 119-28 and accompanying text (discussing
the later First Circuit decision, D'Aprile v. Fleet Servs. Corp., 92 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.
1996)).
See August, 981 F.2d at 578.




r' See id. at 577-78; see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 4(16) (West
1989).
"9 August, 981 F.2d at 581.
60 See id. (citing BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 462 (6th ed. 1990)).
r' See id. at 582.
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August's burden under the statute to show that he was a
"qualified handicapped person" who could perform the job with
or without accommodation. The court held he did not meet this
burden, because of his own admission of his inability to assent
sufficient facts. 2
The August ruling was cited in Kennedy v. Applause, Inc.'
In Kennedy, after a leave and a return to active work, plaintiff, a
salesperson with Chronic Fatigue Syndrome, was certified as
disabled by her doctor who submitted a disability note to the
employer." The plaintiff then applied for state disability bene-
fits (SSA), and she was fired.' In her deposition for the ADA
claim, she maintained that she was able to perform the job, but
the district court granted summary judgment for the employer
based upon her doctor's testimony and her SSA benefit applica-
tion, describing her as "completely disabled."" Interestingly, the
SSA found Kennedy was not totally disabled, and had the ability
to return to work.' Nevertheless, the circuit court upheld the
district court's findings, including its refusal to allow plaintiffs
motion for further discovery to develop more facts to support her
ADA qualification and to inquire into whether she was able to
perform the essential functions of her job.'
The court held that there was no need to determine what
constituted the essential functions of her job, since it concluded
she could not perform the requirements of her employment. 9
Therefore, it was irrelevant whether her employer refused to
provide her with a reasonable accommodation (flexible hours)
that would allow her to continue to work with the disability."0
Despite the fact that she was working the day before she was
62 See id. at 583-84. The dissent could be read to suggest that August's sup-
posed inability to offer evidence was, in fact, a choice made by the majority to inter-
pret his words as legally inconsistent, instead of factually assessing his ability to
return to work as of May 11, when he requested accommodation. See id. at 585-86
(Pettine, J., dissenting). Thus, the court made a ruling of law without interrogating
the facts.
90 F.3d 1477, 1480 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing August v. Offices Unlimited, Inc.,
981 F.2d 576 (1st Cir. 1992)).
4 See Kennedy, 90 F.3d at 1479-80.
See id. at 1480.
es Id.
See id. at 1481. Kennedy cited the SSA's determination that she was able to
return to the job as evidence of a genuine issue of material fact. See id.
63 See id. at 1481-82.
9See id. at 1482.
70 See id.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
fired, the court found that she was unable to present "evidence
that would support her claim that she [was] a 'qualified individ-
ual with a disability' under the ADA.""' Essentially, the court
held she was unable to prove she was capable of performing the
essential functions of the job, with or without accommodation, on
the day she was fired, although she had done so the day before.
It is this type of summary dismissal of the complex factual de-
terminations which underlie ADA claims that makes the use of
judicial estoppel based upon prior assertion of disability for
benefits purposes especially problematic. In light of the pur-
poses and policies of the ADA, outcomes such as that in Kennedy
illustrate the need to allow plaintiffs a sufficient chance to de-
velop facts consonant with their ADA claim.
III. ADA PURPOSES AND RATIONALE
Most of us are aware of the prevalence of prejudice toward
those with disabilities that existed in the earlier part of the
twentieth century. Social policy and popular perception of the
disabled were shaped by Victorian attitudes of pity, and charac-
terizations of the disabled often were not far from images born in
Dickens' London. At that time, disabled individuals were insti-
tutionalized and treated as deranged or incompetent, a practice
which continued well into the 1970s.72 The disabled were in-
cluded with the homeless, the desperately poor, and the insane,
as objects of charity for whom society had an obligation to pro-
vide support." Not until 1956 did the government add those
with disabilities to the Social Security programs through the
creation of SSDI.74 This program did not radically depart from
the historic presumptions and stereotypes about the disabled. It
provided federal financial assistance to those who, by accident of
birth, trauma, or disease, were unable to provide for them-
selves.75
71 Id. at 1479-80, 1482. See supra note 21 (discussing more recent decisions
from the Seventh Circuit).
72See Beaumont, supra note 9, at 1536-38; see also JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, No
PITY: PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A NEW CIVIL RIGHTS MOvEMENT 61, 160
(1993).
22See DIANE DRIEDGER, THE LAST CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT: DISABLED
PEOPLES' INTERNATIONAL 7 (1989).
7" See generally FRANK S. BLOCH, FEDERAL DISABILITY LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.3
(1984).
7r See Frank S. Ravitch, Balancing Fundamental Disability Policies: The Rela-
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The administration of SSA programs reflected these under-
lying assumptions about the disabled and their capabilities.76 By
definition, they were unable to participate in the general work-
force, and thus to be eligible for the program, an applicant im-
plicitly accepted this generalization about his or her capability.7
The purpose of the SSA program was to distribute funds for es-
sential support, not to rectify employment misunderstandings.
Thus, there was little reason to analyze, in the application proc-
ess, the actual working capacity of each applicant. It was imma-
terial that some disabled individuals were unemployable due to
discriminatory stereotyping, since they would still need financial
assistance, regardless of the final cause."
In the interest of administrative efficiency and to speed dis-
tribution of funds to those in need, some disabilities became
"listed impairment[s]" and "presumptive disabilities." In both
cases an applicant can be deemed disabled without any inquiry
into his or her ability to work."0 HIV-positiveness is a presump-
tive disability, as is total blindness.8 With this historical and
contextual background, it is not surprising to find that a com-
plete application for SSI or SSDI can be made over the tele-
phone.'
tionship Between the Americans with Disabilities Act and Social Security Disability,
1 GEO. J. FIGHTING POVERTY 240, 245-46 (1994) (contrasting the goals of SSDI and
ADA); see also EEOC Guidance, supra note 16, at 4.
78 See Wilkinson, supra note 5, at 912-15 for an excellent elaboration of policy
and Rhilosophical grounds for statutory income programs.
"Disability" under the SSA is defined as the "inability to engage in any sub-
stantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. §
423(d)(1)(A) (1994). The claimant must "not only [be] unable to do his previous
work," but also be incapable of "engag[ing] in any other kind of substantial gainful
work which exists in the national economy." Id. § 423(d)(2)(A).
78 See Ravitch, supra note 75, at 245 (quoting the Director of the National Re-
habilitation Hospital Research Center's testimony that the disability program is
"'predicated on the assumption that an individual is either disabled or not disabled,
and that the conditions of individuals who are disabled are so hopeless that future
prospects for work are virtually nil' ).
See generally Ravitch, supra note 75, at 242 (describing the SSI and SSDI
evaluation processes and the "shortcuts" through the listed impairment and pre-
sumptively disabled groupings); Beaumont, supra note 9, at 1548-49 (same).
See id. at 1549.
81 See id. at 1549 n.107 (listing examples of presumptive disabilities) (citing 20
C.F.R. § 934 (1996)).
62 See Weston, supra note 9, at 396 (explaining that the application for SSI
benefits may be made in writing or over the telephone). See generally Wilkinson,
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Nearly twenty years after the inclusion of disabled persons
to Social Security programs, the passage of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 placed the word "discrimination" in the disabilities
lexicon.' Although aimed at creating vocational rehabilitation
programs and job training opportunities for the disabled, the Act
also included § 504, which prohibited discrimination against the
disabled by any federal agency or entity receiving federal fund-
ing under the Act.' Nonetheless, it took a twenty-five day sit-in
demonstration to force promulgation of administration rules un-
der § 504.' Influenced by the civil rights movement and the
policy of de-institutionalization of the handicapped commencing
in the 1960s and 1970s, a series of anti-discrimination protec-
tions for the disabled were passed by Congress, culminating in
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990."
Under its employment provisions, the ADA allows a disabled
person to sue an employer for the failure to hire, or for termina-
tion from a present job, based on disability discrimination.8 7 It is
difficult, however, to argue that a person who cannot walk, can-
not talk, cannot see, is frequently ill, or even frequently de-
pressed, does not have an impediment to job performance.
Therefore, the ADA restricts its coverage to those cases where
the employer's prejudice can be clearly distinguished from the
actual diminished job performance of the disabled.' The tool for
making this determination is the concept of "reasonable accom-
modation." 9 If the disabled applicant could perform the essen-
tial functions of the job with only a slight change in his employ-
ment circumstances, the employer's claim that the disabled
person is not fit for the job can only be discriminatory prejudice.
This handling of discriminatory motive is similar to the now-
accepted presumption of discrimination allowed to survive in
traditional discrimination cases under McDonnell Douglas Corp.
supra note 5, at 925-28 (discussing that the SSA benefit evaluation process has no
face-to-face interviews at initial steps and the probability of avoiding inquiry into
one's ability to work in presumptive disability cases that meet medical criteria).
See Ravitch, supra note 75, at 243.
29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994).
See SHAPIRO, supra note 72, at 64-70 (describing this particular demonstra-
tion as well as others).
88 See Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (1994)).
8See 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (1994).
"See generally Ravitch, supra note 75, at 243-44.
"42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (1994).
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v. Green,"0 where the employer cannot rebut the prima facie case
with a reasonable business justification.9'
Whether the motive is discriminatory, then, requires a fac-
tual investigation of what the disabled plaintiff may be capable
of on the job if just one or two physical, procedural, or conven-
tional barriers are removed for that person. Could he or she do
the job then?92 This special inquiry is the heart of the ADA. It is
this special and unique technique that the Act employs to distin-
guish true incapacity to work due to a handicap, from the irra-
tional fear and exaggeration at the heart of discrimination. The
legislative mandate and the goals of the ADA cannot be accom-
plished without it.9"
In order to litigate under the Act, a person must meet cer-
tain requirements. Under the ADA, a qualified plaintiff is "an
individual with a disability who satisfies the requisite skill, ex-
perience, education and other job-related requirements of the
employment position such individual holds or desires, and who,
with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the es-
sential functions of such position."' Thus, disabled individuals
are qualified if they have: (a) the ordinary prerequisites for the
job; and (b) their handicap does not prevent them from exercising
the essential functions of the job.95 This test must be an
"individualized" inquiry, and it must be performed on a
"case-by-case" basis.9 It is difficult to see how this jurisdictional
question of fact can be considered if a court, sua sponte,9 raises
the issue of judicial estoppel first, and then answers it as a mat-
411 U.S. 792 (1973)
'1 See id. at 802 (explaining that the employer must "articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection").
92The dissent in August v. Offices Unlimited, Inc., states this plainly:. "[Tihe key
factual inquiry is whether... August could have returned to work had OUI accom-
modated his disability as [requested]." August, 981 F.2d 576, 585 (1st Cir. 1992)
(Pettine, J., dissenting).
93See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 39-40 (1990) (discussing the requirement
that employers make reasonable accommodations), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.CAN.
303, 320-22; EEOC Guidance, supra note 16, at E-14, n.25 and accompanying text.
. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (1998); accord 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994) (defining
"qualified individual with a disability"); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.3 (giving excep-
tions to this definition).
' See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (1988).
's EEOC Guidance, supra note 16, at E-4.
Judicial estoppel is an "'equitable doctrine invoked by a court at its discre-
tion.'" Yanez v. United States, 989 F.2d 323, 326 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Morris v.
California, 966 F.2d 448, 453 (9th Cir: 1991)).
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ter of law.
As we have seen, a matter of law in this context is often a
battle of definitions, and the opportunity for further factual
deposition or investigation may not be granted." The definition
of "disability" in different programs then becomes determinative.
In the case of SSA applications, the term "reflects the obligation
to provide benefits to people who generally are unable to work.""
SSA does not distinguish between the "customary requirements"
of the position and the "essential functions" of the position,
which is precisely what the ADA is concerned with."° An appli-
cant can be considered disabled by the SSA, but qualified by the
ADA, for what in essence is a slightly different job-one nar-
rowed to the essential functions of the position.1"' The SSA cate-
gorically refuses to consider whether an employer could make
reasonable accommodations as part of its determination."° This
raises an obvious question: If the SSA explicitly, purposely, and
reasonably denies any association between its definitions and
ADA qualifications, how could a court justifiably use the SSA
definition to rule on an ADA question?
IV. JUDICIAL ENLIGHTENMENT
Some courts have refused to use judicial estoppel or grant
summary judgment on ADA claims when presented with evi-
dence of statutory income disability benefit applications. In
Overton v. Reilly,' the court ruled that a person could have a
disability for SSA purposes and still be a qualified individual
with a disability.' Overton was hired by the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) to do internal staff work even though
the EPA was aware that he had an emotional disorder which
made it difficult for him to communicate with the public.0 5 After
performing equivocal work in that role (he sometimes fell asleep
due to medication, yet processed more than his share of paper-
work), he was required by a new supervisor to do more public
communication, which resulted in increasingly poor reviews, and
"a See supra notes 51-71 and accompanying text.99 EEOC Guidance, supra note 16, at E-4.
'0 Id. at E-5.
101 See id.
102 See id.
103 977 F.2d 1190 (7th Cir. 1992).
104 See id. at 1196.
'0 See id. at 1191.
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he was finally fired in December 1986."c Before he had been
hired by the EPA, Overton had applied for and been granted SSA
disability benefits, which were distributed to him during his
employment on a nine-month trial basis.1"" The benefits were
granted since Overton had a "listed disability,""8 and these
benefits then continued after his dismissal.' The district court
granted summary judgment for the EPA because Overton had
presented no evidence that he could have performed the essen-
tial functions of his job."0
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit re-examined whether there
was a genuine issue of material fact about whether Overton was
"otherwise qualified" for his position."' It considered first
whether contact with the public was an essential function of his
job, and then, even if it was, whether it could have been per-
formed with reasonable accommodation." The court simply
found that these questions could not be fairly answered based on
what was before it, and, therefore, the summary judgment was
overturned. "At trial, these potential accommodations may turn
out to be unduly burdensome on the EPA, but we cannot say that
the agency has presented evidence sufficient to make the con-
clusion inevitable."" The court also cautioned that it was as-
sessing only the threshold question of whether he was qualified
for the position-not whether he was nevertheless rightfully
fired, with or without discrimination." Most importantly, since
the benefits were granted as a "listed disability" and no inquiry
was made by SSA into his ability to find a job, the agency de-
termination "may be relevant evidence of the severity of Over-
ton's handicap, but it can hardly be construed as a judgment that
Overton could not do his job at the EPA.""5
In another case, Mohamed v. Marriott International, Inc.,"
6
a district court recognized that positive evaluations and lack of
" See id. at 1191-92.
107 See id at 1192. SSA was notified of Overton's new employment, but under its
regulations it could distribute the funds anyway on the "trial" basis. Id-
102 Id- at 1196.
"' See id. at 1192.
110 See i&d at 1193.
.. Id- at 1194-96.
12 See id at 1194-95.
1 Id at 1195.
114 See id. at 1195-96.
'15 Id. at 1196.
"6 944 F. Supp. 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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disciplinary measures were strong evidence that the terminated
plaintiff was performing the essential functions of the job."7 The
court reached this conclusion in favor of the plaintiff in spite of
the fact that the SSA had granted him benefits based on the
listed disability of profound deafness.1
8
The same court which issued the August ruling later re-
versed direction in DAprile v. Fleet-Services Corp."9 The plain-
tiff, D'Aprile, who suffered from multiple sclerosis, sought to re-
acclimate herself to full-time work after a medical leave necessi-
tated by earlier severe symptoms.' D'Aprile's doctor advised
her to return to work on a part-time basis before resuming her
full-time position. 2 However, one of her superiors believed such
an arrangement would conflict with company policy and ob-
structed D'Aprile's attempts to work out a solution. Finally, af-
ter working part-time using vacation benefits, D'Aprile was
forced to resume disability leave and apply for benefits as totally
disabled. 2 She received the benefits under Fleet's short and
long-term disability plans until January 21, 1995, when it was
determined she was no longer totally disabled."'
In this case, the First Circuit found that since D'Aprile ap-
plied for benefits after the defendant's refusal to accommodate
her, and because her disability policy defined "totally disabled"
as merely anything less than full-time work, there was a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether she could have continued
with the reasonable accommodation of part-time work.' The
court distinguished this case from the holding of August in two
ways. First, August had claimed (in his post-employment dis-
ability application) that he was totally disabled before he re-
117 See id. at 282; see also Daffron v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 874 S.W.2d 482,
488 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that there is a genuine issue of fact as to whether
the plaintiff was capable of performing his job when he performed his duty until the
date of termination).
18 See Mohamed, 944 F. Supp. at 282-83. The court rejected the use of judicial
estoppel in an opinion that highlighted the difference in the ADA and SSA defini-
tions, procedures, and legal standards. See id. at 282-84; see also Sims, supra note
6, at 854-55, 862-65 (discussing Mohamed).
11 92 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1996). The panel opinion was authored by District Court
Judge Gertner, who sat with Circuit Judges Aldrich and Cyr, by designation. See id.
20 See id. at 2.
121 See id.
122 See id. at 2-3.
'2 See id. at3.
124 Id. at 5.
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quested an accommodation from the employer.' Second, the
definition of disability in D'Aprile was never complete. 12 6  Like
the Overton court, the First Circuit found that the critical issue
to be resolved was "how D'Aprile would have fared had the ac-
commodation been made," 7 an issue fit for trial, upon which her
subsequent application for benefits "sheds no light."'
It seems clear that some courts are able to recognize that a
person's representation that he is "disabled" for disability benefit
purposes does not make that person unqualified for protection
under the ADA, and neither the invocation of judicial estoppel
2' See id. at 4-5. 'The issue which concerned us in August, that a plaintiff
would claim that he was entitled to a reasonable accommodation at the same time
he claimed to be unable to work at all, is absent here." Id. at 4. This seems to char-
acterize August as an example of true judicial estoppel in the First Circuit, and dis-
tinguishes D'Aprile's facts at least in part on the basis of timing.
126 See id.
27 Id. at 5.
Id. at 5. This was the position taken in the dissenting opinion of August by
Judge Pettine. See August v. Offices Unlimited, Inc., 981 F.2d 576, 585-87 (1st Cir.
1992) (Pettine, J., dissenting). He also applied August strictly to the district court
summary judgment in D'Aprile, causing this review. See D'Aprile v. Fleet Serv.
Corp., No. 94-0524P, 1995 WL 854482, at *2 (D.R.I. Nov. 22, 1995), rev'd, 92 F.3d 1
(1st Cir. 1996). In Blanton v. Inco Alloys International Inc., 123 F.3d 916 (6th Cir.
1997) (supplemental opinion) (per curiam), the Sixth Circuit also refused to adopt a
broad view of judicial estoppel in a case where a plaintiff asserted that he could not
perform the essential functions of his former position. The court issued its supple-
mental opinion in response to motions for rehearing by the defendant and the
EEOC, which filed as amicus curiae. See id. at 917. The supplemental opinion
makes clear that "[tihe paners opinion should not be read to endorse judicial estop-
pel in this context." Id. The Sixth Circuit noted with approval the decision of the
D.C. Circuit in Swanks v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 116
F.3d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1997), which held that "the receipt of disability benefits does not
preclude subsequent ADA relief and rejects the doctrine of judicial estoppel, but
does allow the consideration of prior sworn statements by the parties as a material
factor." Blanton, 123 F.3d at 917. The court reiterated its prior conclusion that the
plaintiff needed to show that when he sought to return to work and requested a
transfer to a vacant position, the defendant failed to reasonably accommodate his
request. See id.
In another recent decision from the Sixth Circuit, Griffith v. Wal-Mart Stores
Inc., 135 F.3d 376 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 67 U.S.L.W. 3027 (U.S. June 1, 1999)
(No. 97-1991), a former Wal-Mart employee who suffered from a bad back was per-
mitted to sue under the ADA despite his assertion of disability in order to obtain
Social Security disability benefits. See Id. at 380-84. The court rejected the use of
judicial estoppel because the application for and receipt of SSA benefits does not
consider the plaintiffs ability to work with reasonable accommodation, which is the
ADA standard. See id. at 383. "[P]rior statements should not be the subject of judi-
cial estoppel or a theory of 'super admissions,' but rather should be analyzed under
traditional summary judgment principles." Id.
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nor an abbreviated summary judgment is fair or appropriate.m
The conflicts we see in these cases are conflicts between per-
formance-based rules under the ADA and status-based rules un-
der SSA. It seems something of a betrayal of the intent of the
ADA for the courts to apply summary judgment ("no genuine is-
sue of material fact") to a case, based upon a status determina-
tion by another agency when the ADA demands a particularized
performance ("fact") inquiry into each situation. This is particu-
larly true since the ADA is intended to prevent discrimination
based on status or stereotypes, such as being handicapped.
V. JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL IS INAPPROPRIATELY OR IMPROPERLY
APPLIED IN DISABILITY BENEFITS/ADA CASES
Judicial estoppel, as applied in most disability benefit cases,
relies on legal assumptions that are demonstrably wrong."'
Thus, judicial estoppel should not preclude ADA complaints.
First, SSA and ADA definitions of disability are not identical. 1 '
SSA disability determinations simply do not mean what they ap-
pear to mean, and should not be treated simplistically by courts.
An SSA determination that an applicant is "totally disabled"
does not mean that he cannot do anything. As one court put it, it
may be determined that "a claimant is unlikely to find a job."3 2
Under SSA, the claimant has the burden of showing that he or
she is unable to do his or her previous work or engage in any
other type of substantial gainful work which exists in the na-
tional economy."3 This is not a scientific evaluation of an appli-
cant's capacity to do meaningful work. The SSA evaluation does
not consider whether the situation was caused or worsened by
discrimination. Indeed, the SSA determination is so remote from
the plain-sense meaning of the words "total disability" that the
SSA allows its "totally disabled" to hold income-producing jobs
129 See EEOC Guidance, supra note 16, at 9.
'3 See Teledyne Industries, Inc. v. NLRB, 911 F.2d 1214, 1217-20 (6th Cir.
1990) for a detailed analysis of the conditions necessary for properly applied judicial
estop)Pel.
See Luby, supra note 7, at 427-37; see also Weigel v. Target Stores, 122 F.3d
461, 466-67 (7th Cir. 1997) (discussing the EEOC's determination that a person who
is "totally disabled" under the SSA is not dispositive as to whether he or she is a
"qualified individual" under the ADA).2Overton v. Reilly, 977 F.2d 1190, 1196 (7th Cir. 1992).
' See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(a), (d)(2)(a) (1994).
[73:349
1999] JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL AND ADA COMPLAINTS 369
while collecting their full SSDI benefits."1 Judicial estoppel is
best applied to inconsistent positions." It takes only a cursory
examination to reveal that the definitions of terms used in the
SSA determinations are easily misleading and unreliable indica-
tors of performance, and thus should not result in a bar to the
factual development of the ADA claim.
Another requirement of judicial estoppel is that the position
formerly taken by one party must have been presented in a judi-
cial or quasi-judicial forum.3 6 Judicial estoppel is applied "to
protect the integrity of the courts,""7 and it is applied to protect
the court's appearance of fairness. For estoppel to apply, the
contradicting position that the charging party now seeks to
abandon must have been offered and accepted within the judicial
system, under the scrutiny of the adversarial system, and, pre-
sumably, before another judge or fact-finder.' The moral indig-
nation aspect of judicial estoppel arises from the doctrine's re-
fusal to allow the plaintiff to make a fool out of the courts or
judges. Therefore, it is clearly inapplicable in situations where
the charging party: has not made any statements before any tri-
bunal (such as a telephone application); has not sought the pro-
tection or judgment of a fact finder (such as those presumptively
disabled or with listed disabilities); never asserted total disabil-
ity (such as those who stated they were unemployed for lack of
accommodation); or was forced or advised by his or her employer
(or doctor) to submit a disability application. These applicants
have not harmed the judicial system, nor do they deserve to be
stopped at the bottom rung of the judicial ladder when seeking to
assert legitimate civil rights.
'3 42 U.S.C. § 422(c) (1994); see also Marvello v. Chemical Bank, 923 F. Supp.
487, 491-92 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (explaining that the SSA allows recipients to work for a
maximum of nine months in order to encourage them to find jobs).
'3 See Douglas W. Henkin, Judicial Estoppel-Beating Shields Into Swords and
Back Again, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1711, 1713 (1991) (noting that the jurisdictions
which have adopted the doctrine of judicial estoppel are in conflict as to the basic
requirements needed for it to be satisfied).
'a See id. at 1715 (stating that the courts are split as to whether the party
seeking the use of estoppel is required to have been a party in the first proceeding).
'3 McNemar v. Disney Stores, Inc., 91 F.3d 610, 616 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
519 U.S. 1115 (1997).
m See Shell Oil Co. v. Trailer & Truck Repair Co., 828 F.2d 205, 209-10 (3d Cir.
1987) (noting that judicial estoppel bars the assertion of any contradictory factual
position); see also Smith v. Travelers Ins. Co., 438 F.2d 373, 377 (6th Cir. 1971)
(asserting that the scope of judicial estoppel does not include inconsistencies be-
tween judicial and non-judicial statements).
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Some judicial estoppel rulings pertain to cases where the
statutory income support application was completed after the
terminated employee was allegedly discriminated against.
139
Since the ADA issue is the motive for the termination at the time
termination occurs,140 a disability determination made later by
another agency cannot have had any influence on the employer's
motive.' Although some courts have applied judicial estoppel in
such circumstances, there appears to be no reason to fairly jus-
tify that in light of the ADA procedures and goals. If this ir-
relevant after-acquired evidence were presented by the em-
ployer, it would amount to presenting evidence of a record of
having a disability by the charging party, which itself is a dis-
criminatory act.'
In many of the cases discussed herein, the courts ended the
litigation with a summary judgment for the employer. Summary
judgment is granted when "there is no genuine issue [of] mate-
rial fact and.., the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law."' The contested fact is often the degree of disabil-
ity of the charging party, where the defendant employer argues
that the plaintiff is too disabled to work-as demonstrated by
the plaintiffs confession of "total disability"-and therefore not a
"qualified" person under the ADA.'45 Because this is a matter of
definition, it appears to be a matter of law suitable to summary
judgment, though it has now become clear that the same words,
'39 See, e.g., Mohamed v. Marriott Intl, Inc., 944 F. Supp. 277, 279 (S.D.N.Y.
1996); Smith v. Dovenmuehle Mortgage Inc., 859 F. Supp. 1138, 1139-40 (N.D. Ill.
1994).
140 See Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act,
29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 2(m) (1996).
141 See, e.g., Mohamed, 944 F. Supp. at 282; D'Aprile v. Fleet Servs. Corp., 92
F.3d 1, 4 (st Cir. 1996).
142 The Supreme Court has recognized that the goals of eliminating discrimina-
tion in the workplace and providing compensation to victims can only be achieved by
private litigants seeking redress for injuries. See McKennon v. Nashville Banner
Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 358-59 (1995) (discussing the importance of individual
lawsuits in enforcing rights granted under Title VII and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA)).
143 See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B) (1994) (defining "disability" as "a record of such
an impairment"); see also Beaumont, supra note 9, at 1570 (discussing how judicial
estoppel "stops the clock at the moment that a person with a disability encounters a
program of statutory income supports and brands that person as incapable of
working for a period that may extend far beyond the actual duration of her disabil-
ity" and that the ADA expressly prohibits discriminatory use of such records).
144 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
14 Wilkinson, supra note 5, at 931-33.
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used by different agencies, have vastly different meanings.
Therefore, these definitions have little bearing on the central
question of an ADA claim, which asks whether the claimant in
fact was able to perform the essential functions of the job.
Summary judgment is seldom appropriate unless the court has
given ample regard to the factual performance of the claimant,
both before and after the dismissal.
146
General policy considerations also weigh against the broad
use of estoppel. Equitable doctrines should not be a complete bar
to an anti-discrimination suit. 47  "The objectives of [anti-
discrimination statutes] are furthered when even a single em-
ployee establishes that an employer has discriminated against
him or her."' The legislative history and findings associated
with the passage of the ADA are also evidence of Congress's in-
tent that the ADA be a powerful tool to redress discrimination,
even though the legislation is silent on the issue of "double re-
covery."5 ' On the other hand, the SSA's continuation of benefits
during a trial period of work suggests that the SSA appreciates
the unpredictability of employment outcomes for the disabled
and thus provides for some measure of double-dipping under
that statutory scheme. Another policy problem is the obvious
fact that judicial estoppel is enforced differently in different cir-
cuits, so that the exact same case could have different outcomes
in different parts of the country.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Judicial estoppel allows a court to unilaterally terminate a
146 The EEOC Guidance finds summary judgment as "inappropriate" as judicial
estoppel based largely on the variations among definitions by different agencies.
EEOC Guidance, supra note 16, at E-10.
147 See generally McKennon, 513 U.S. at 358-60 (recognizing that the national
interests served by anti-discrimination suits are effectuated by declining to allow
later wrongdoers to present an absolute bar to earlier discrimination).
14 Id. at 358.
14 See Sims, supra note 6, at 866 (discussing legislative history of the ADA and
the goal of legislators to protect victims of discrimination); see also H.R. REP. No.
101-485, pt. 3, at 32-33 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 314-15.1"a McNemar v. Disney Store, Inc., 91 F.3d 610, 620 (3d Cir. 1996) (recognizing
the district court's concern that the legislature should authorize a "double recovery,"
not the courts), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1115 (1997); see also Blanton v. Inco Alloys
Intl, Inc., 123 F.3d 916, 917 n.1 (6th Cir. 1997) (noting that a double recovery may
be avoided by reducing a backpay award) (citing Swanks v. Washington Metro. Area
Transit Auth., 116 F.3d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1997)).
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claim before it is fully articulated and before it is subject to the
truth-seeking function of a trial or motion for summary judg-
ment. Rather than curtly dismissing the case, the courts could
treat representations made to another agency about one's dis-
ability as admissible evidence presented by the defendant em-
ployer, and then use evidentiary examination to elicit the rele-
vance and weight of these representations as they bear on the
core ADA issue of ability to perform with (or without) reasonable
accommodation. The benefit application can be one factor in the
overall assessment of the plaintiffs prima facie case. Alterna-
tively, "total disability" could be treated as a "rebuttable pre-
sumption" where the plaintiff has claimed it in disability appli-
cations.'51  Finally, legislative relief is another possibility. A
5"' Sims, supra note 6, at 866; Cleveland v. Policy Management Sys. Corp., 120
F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 1997), vacated and remanded, 119 S. Ct. 1597 (1999). The
use of a rebuttable presumption is not truly desirable in this context because it
provides an advantage to the defendant at the summary judgment stage rather than
allowing the plaintiff a fair chance to develop the issues surrounding the alleged
discrimination. The assertion of other statutory rights should not result in an auto-
matic preclusion of ADA claims.
In Cleveland, the Fifth Circuit granted summary judgment to the defendant in
light of the plaintiffs sworn statements that she was disabled for Social Security
benefit purposes. The court found no genuine issue of material fact rebutting the
presumption that the plaintiff was judicially esptopped from asserting that she was
thereafter a "qualified individual with a disability" under the ADA. The petition for
certiorari in the Cleveland case was granted to answer the following questions:
1. Whether the application for, or receipt of, disability insurance benefits under
the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 428 (1994), creates a rebuttable presumption
that the applicant or recipient is judicially estopped from asserting that she is a
"qualified individual with a disability" under the American with Disabilities Act of
1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (1994).
2. If it does not create such a presumption, what weight, if any, should be given
to the application for, or receipt of disability insurance benefits when a person as-
serts she is a "qualified individual with a disability" under the ADA. Id.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently followed its Cleveland
"rebuttable presumption" rule in Pena v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 154 F.3d
267 (5th Cir. 1998), a case involving an employee who represented that he was to-
tally disabled on applications for long-term disability (LTD) benefits and mortgage
disability benefits. See id. at 268. As part of Pena's application for LTD, he was re-
quired to fill out a disability report for the Social Security Administration wherein
he claimed that his condition" 'hamper[ed] all job duties.' " Id. (alteration in origi-
nal). The court noted that the language of disability under the LTD was very similar
to the ADA definition and thus it would be difficult for Pena to rebut the presump-
tion. See id. at 269.
Even if the definition of total disability in a long-term disability plan mirrors
that in the ADA such as in Pena, issues such as the varying severity of the disability
at the time of the alleged discrimination, as opposed to at the time of application for
disability benefits, as well as whether plaintiff requested but was denied reasonable
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simple declaration that determinations issued by statutory in-
come support programs are not relevant to the determination of
whether a plaintiff is a "qualified person" under the Act would go
a long way toward removing this issue from ADA litigation.
Rather, a plaintiffs assertion of disability for benefit purposes
should be just one piece of evidence weighed at the summary
judgment stage. Where the plaintiff thereafter succeeds in
proving discrimination under the ADA, the award may be re-
duced to prevent an unfair double recovery.
accommodation in order to perform the essential functions of her job, may warrant
an opportunity for plaintiff to present these facts, and other facts relevant to the
purported ADA violations, on a level playing field, rather than one tipped in favor of
the defendant. In the Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae on Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp., (No. 97-1008), the Social Security
Administration, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and the United
States Solicitor General supported a "case-by-case assessment of the specific abili-
ties of the person, the specific requirements of the position that the person holds or
desires, and the manner in which the person may be able or enabled to meet those
requirements." Amicus Brief at 2 (citing EEOC Guidance, supra note 16). The Ami-
cus Brief further noted that SSA forms "do not suggest that a claimant may qualify
the statements attesting to his disability and inability to work if he were provided
reasonable accommodation." Id- at 4. Perhaps the SSA should amend its forms to
permit the applicant to qualify for SSA benefits without jeopardizing his or her po-
tential future ADA claims. (Private long-term disability benefit applications present
a separate issue, and one where the affiliation with the employer may be likely to
encourage disability definitions that closely resemble those in the ADA, as existed in
Pena). In the meantime, neither the law nor equitable principles support the use of
a rebuttable presumption in cases where an ADA plaintiff has asserted disability for
benefit purposes.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
ADDENDUM
As this article goes to press, the United States Supreme
Court issued a unanimous decision in Cleveland v. Policy Man-
agement Systems Corp.'52 Justice Stephen Breyer, writing for the
Court, clarified that claiming SSDI program benefits does not
automatically estop a disabled person from pursuing an ADA
complaint."3  Nor does it create a rebuttable presumption
against a plaintiffs ADA claim, the standard set by the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit."M The Court perceived no inherent
conflict between the two federal statutory schemes.' 5  A plaintiff
must, however, explain any "apparent contradiction" between
the representations made for benefit purposes and the necessary
elements of the ADA claim, establishing "that she could 'perform
the essential functions' of her previous job at least with
'reasonable accommodation,' " in order to survive the traditional
summary judgment process.156
152 119 S. Ct. 1597 (1999), vacating and remanding 120 F.3d 513 (5th Cir. 1997).
' See id. at 1600.
14 See id. at 1602.1 See id.
' Id. at 1600, 1603.
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